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Constitutional courts play an essential role in safeguarding democracy, maintaining constitutional supremacy, and protecting fundamental rights within modern legal systems. This study aims to analyze and compare the roles of the Constitutional Court of Indonesia (Mahkamah Konstitusi) and the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany (Bundesverfassungsgericht) in upholding democratic governance and constitutional order. Using a normative-juridical and comparative constitutional law approach, this research examines constitutional provisions, statutory regulations, landmark judicial decisions, and recent scholarly literature related to constitutional adjudication and judicial independence. The findings reveal that both courts function as guardians of democracy through judicial review and constitutional interpretation; however, significant differences exist regarding institutional independence, enforcement mechanisms, judicial authority, and public trust. Germany’s constitutional model demonstrates stronger institutional stability, abstract constitutional review, and higher legal compliance, whereas Indonesia’s Constitutional Court continues to face challenges associated with political influence, democratic consolidation, and inconsistent implementation of constitutional decisions. The originality of this study lies in its integration of comparative constitutional analysis with contemporary discussions on democratic resilience and judicial legitimacy in transitional democracies. Nevertheless, this research is limited to doctrinal and comparative legal analysis and does not incorporate empirical interviews or quantitative institutional data. The study concludes that strengthening judicial independence, enhancing constitutional enforcement, and improving public trust are essential to reinforce democratic governance in Indonesia. This research contributes to the broader discourse on comparative constitutional law and the evolving role of constitutional courts in contemporary democracies.

Presidential elections constitute a central mechanism for democratic legitimacy in Indonesia’s constitutional system. While previous studies have extensively examined electoral competition, coalition politics, and democratic consolidation, limited attention has been given to how electoral legitimacy can be evaluated through the normative framework of siyasah syariyyah. This gap is significant because legitimacy in Islamic constitutional thought extends beyond electoral victory and encompasses justice (al-‘adl), public welfare (maslahah), and trustworthiness (amanah) as foundational principles of governance. This study analyzes the legitimacy of Indonesia’s presidential elections from 2004 to 2019 by examining the electoral cycles of 2004, 2009, 2014, and 2019 through the perspective of siyasah syariyyah. Employing a qualitative normative-juridical method and doctrinal legal analysis, the study utilizes constitutional documents, electoral regulations, judicial decisions, and relevant scholarly literature as primary sources. The findings demonstrate that electoral legitimacy in Indonesia is shaped not only by constitutional procedures and electoral outcomes but also by the quality of political competition, coalition formation, and public acceptance of electoral results. Using al-‘adl, maslahah, and amanah as analytical indicators, the study finds that democratic legitimacy and Islamic constitutional legitimacy are complementary rather than contradictory. The analysis further reveals that legitimacy is strengthened when electoral processes uphold fairness, promote public welfare, and encourage accountable political leadership. This article contributes to the scholarship on Islamic constitutional law by proposing a siyasah syariyyah-based framework for assessing electoral legitimacy, thereby integrating democratic constitutionalism with Islamic principles of governance in contemporary Muslim-majority states.

Currency depreciation in developing countries is commonly treated as a macroeconomic phenomenon; however, this study reconceptualizes it as a constitutional issue of economic governance involving state responsibility, institutional accountability, and socio-economic rights protection. This research examines how constitutional and legal systems regulate monetary stability obligations amid persistent currency depreciation. The study focuses on selected developing countries, namely Lebanon, Argentina, Iran, Indonesia, Laos, and Paraguay, which reflect diverse institutional arrangements and varying degrees of monetary instability shaped by fiscal structures, governance capacity, and external economic pressures. A normative juridical method is applied through statutory interpretation, doctrinal analysis, and comparative legal approaches to examine the relationship between constitutional law and monetary governance. The findings indicate that currency depreciation is not merely a technical economic issue but also reflects structural weaknesses in constitutional governance, particularly in fiscal–monetary coordination, institutional accountability, and enforcement of public welfare obligations. The study develops the Constitutional Monetary Responsibility Framework (CMRF), integrating monetary stability, state responsibility, constitutional accountability, and socio-economic rights protection into a unified model. This framework positions currency depreciation as a constitutional stress indicator affecting institutional legitimacy and economic rights realization. The study contributes to constitutional economic governance literature by offering a comparative legal perspective on monetary instability in developing countries and argues that effective responses require both macroeconomic adjustments and strengthened constitutional oversight. The research is limited by reliance on secondary legal sources and recommends future empirical socio-legal studies to validate the framework.